Some ways in which farmers in LDCs can protect their living standards against fluctuations in income are discussed. After considering the theory of consumption under uncertainty when there is no or limited borrowing, the case where some borrowing is allowed is also examined. Empirical evidence from some LDCs is used to look at (i) household borrowing and lending, their importance and timing, and their role in smoothing consumption, and (ii) the life-cycle behavior of consumption and income. The results suggest that "hump" lifecycle saving is not likely to be a very important generator of wealth in LDCs and provide further evidence on the limited role of credit markets.
I. Introduction
Agricultural income is inherently uncertain. Weather, pests, disease and fires make yields uncertain, and the notorious variability of agricultural prices can generate fluctuations in farmers' incomes even when output is stable. In poor countries, most of the population earns its living from agriculture, either directly or indirectly. For many of these people, a poor harvest or a low harvest price can threaten disaster, even if, on average, agricultural incomes are sufficient to provide a sustainable standard of living. In such circumstances, the protection of living standards requires that resources be transferred across time, from good years to bad years. For this to work, someone, farmers, communities, or governments, have to be able to look ahead, and make adequate provision for the future. Until
II. Theory: Saving with Borrowing Constraints
Individuals in poor countries borrow and lend money, and perhaps do so to prevent shortfalls in consumption. However, it remains implausible that agents can always borrow as much as they like for consumption purposes, so that it is important to examine behavior when borrowing is not permitted. The essential point to note is that the inability to borrow does not imply that the consumer cannot save. Indeed, the fact that borrowing may be unavailable when most needed is itself a reason to set aside something when times are good; liquidity constraints reinforce the precautionary demand for assets. Many consumers may never wish to borrow; people who are patient, or for whom the return on assets is sufficient to overcome their impatience, will tend to postpone consumption, building up assets as they go, so that temporary short-falls of income are unlikely to pose a problem, except perhaps early in life. But for those who are impatient, or who are poor enough to feel that future consumption is an inadequate reward for postponing current consumption, lack of borrowing facilities will be a real disadvantage. For such consumers, it is essential to hold some assets that can be used to buffer consumption when incomes are low.
A simple model of optimal buffering is constructed in Deaton (199 la), and is summarized here as a starting point. Preferences take the standard form, E,<v(c,)
ere is th rte o tim p a v ( is th intat where 6 > 0 is the rate of time preference, and v(c,) is the instantaneous (sub) utility function, assumed to be increasing, strictly concave, and differentiable. The evolution of assets is given by A,+1 =(1 +r)(A, +y,-c,)
where y, is labor income, A, is real assets and r is the real interest rate. I assume that r < 6, so that the agent's impatience outweighs the incentive to accumulate. The real interest rate is treated as fixed and known, and all the uncertainty is focussed on labor income y,. Labor is inelastically supplied, and Yt is a stationary random variable with support [yo, y,], with y( > 0 and Yo<y, < oo, so that income cannot fall below the positive floor y,. I start from the most obvious form of the borrowing restriction, viz.
A, 0.
The simplest way to solve the consumer's problem is to start from the modification of the usual Euler equations that is brought about by the presence of the borrowing constraint (3). Define the state variable x, "cash on hand", by x=A + y,.
x, is the maximum that can be spent on consumption in period t.
Consumption in periods t and t + 1 must satisfy A(c,)= max [I(x,), fE,A(c,+ i)]
where A;(c) is the marginal utility of c, i.e. A)(c) v'(c), B=(1 + r)/l + 6), and / < 1 since r< 6. If the consumer is constrained, consumption can be no higher than x,, and the marginal utility no lower than A(x,). The constraint will bind if marginal utility at x, is higher than the discounted expected marginal utility next period, otherwise the two marginal utilities are equated in the usual way. Note that the expectation itself takes account of the possibility of future constraints. The solution to (5) depends on the stochastic structure of the income process y,. Here, since my interest is in extending the model in other directions, I deal with only the simplest case where income is independently and identically distributed over time. Deaton (199 la) discusses cases where income is a first order autoregressive or moving average process. In the i.i.d. case, the optimal rule is to make consumption a function of cash on hand, i.e. c,=f(x,)
where, by virtue of (4) and (2), x, evolves according to x,+ = (1 + r)x,-f(x,)} + y,
and y,, labor income, is an i.i.d. stochastic process.
In general, it is not possible to write down an analytical form for the function f(x). However, the theory can be used to infer its general properties, and in practice, given specifications for the utility function and the distribution function of incomes, as well as the interest rate and timepreference parameters, the function can be calculated numerically. Given his cash on hand, the consumer should spend everything if the total is below some critical value x*, say. Above x*, something is put by for the future, and the marginal propensity to retain cash, although always less than unity, is an increasing function of cash on hand. If the consumer follows the optimal rule, consumption can be very much smoother than income; if the income process is normally distributed with mean 100 and standard deviation 10, if utility is isoelastic with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3, and if the interest and time-preference rates are 5 per cent and 10 per cent respectively, the standard deviation of consumption is 5, which is half that of income. This can be achieved with very low average levels of "buffer" assets, averaging only 7 and rarely more than 10. However, consumption fluctuations are necessarily asymmetric. It is always possible to prevent consumption being too high, since resources can be kept for the future. But if assets are exhausted, as must happen from time to time, there is always the possibility of low income immediately thereafter, and the unprotected consumer has no choice but to cut consumption to match. Of course, these outcomes are no worse than would be the case if consumption were equal to income, and the optimal buffering strategy much reduces their likelihood. When they occur, the shadow price of the borrowing constraint, the shadow price of loans, will rise to high levels; for the same parameter values, rates of 30 per cent occur every twenty years or so, and rates of well over 100 per cent are possible. There is a demand for loans at even very high rates of interest.
The calculation of the optimal policy (11) from the conditions (5) and (7) is not a trivial task. The function has to be approximated by points along a grid, or by some suitable polynomial, and then values or parameters chosen to satisfy the functional equations as closely as possible. The question then arises as to whether consumers could reasonably be expected to solve this problem for themselves, and if not, whether there might not exist simpler, more intuitive rules of thumb that might do nearly as well. In Figure 1 , the broken line shows the optimal policy for a consumer with the preferences and income process described above, while the piecewise linear function shows the simple rule of thumb: "spend all cash on hand up to mean income, and 30 per cent of any excess". (The third function on the graph will be discussed below.) My choice of rule of thumb is not arbitrary, but was guided to some extent by knowledge of the optimal function. However, the critical point at which saving begins was taken to be mean income rather than any approximation to the optimal critical point. Note also that the rule-of-thumb function is never below the optimal function, so that the consumption is always too high, and I have made no attempt to achieve a better approximation. My concern is more that the rule should be simple, simple enough to have plausibly evolved from trial and error. 
where I(.) is the indicator function. The outcomes in the figure are very close to those generated by the optimal policy, indeed there seems to be no practical difference between the two. Not only does the rule-of-thumb reproduce all the characteristics of the stochastic equilibrium under the optimal policy, but there is no perceptible welfare difference. transition matrix T with element ti, the probability that, given x is xx; in t, it is xxj in t+1. We also have a grid of subutility values vi= v(c,)= v{f(xx,)}, so that the expected utility associated with xx is the infinite sum of terms of the form (1 + 6)-~Tv or {1-(1+ 6)-1 T}-v). Figure 3 also shows the value functions associated with a number of other possible consumption strategies. The next best after the optimal strategy and the rule-of-thumb is a second rule of thumb where, instead of saving 70 per cent of the excess above ,u, only 50 per cent is saved, so that there is even more excess consumption than by the first rule. Quite some way below comes the value function that comes from the simplest policy of all, that associated with setting consumption equal to income and accumulating no assets. Finally, the worst policy shown is the ultra-conservative one of spending no more than mean income, and spending less if cash on hand is less. These rankings show that, at least for these parameters, the rules of thumb do well capturing most of the benefits of the more complicated optimal policy, and that any sensible rule of this form does a great deal better than the "obvious" policy of never saving anything. These results are not surprising given earlier results in the commodity storage literature, where piecewise linear storage functions are known to perform well relative to fully optimal policies; see Newbery and Stiglitz (1981, Chapter 30). One feature of these results that is perhaps surprising is the small values that are attached by consumers to any form of consumption smoothing. Figure 3 can be used to read off the amount that a "consumption equals income" consumer would pay to be instructed in the optimal buffering policy, and the answer is close to 10, which is one tenth of mean income, or one standard deviation of income. This amount is the discounted present value of the improvement, not a continuing per period gain, and seems a very small amount to pay for the consumption stream in Figure 2 rather than the income stream immediately above it. Of course, the agent who buffers consumption loses utility by holding assets, as well as gaining from the greater stability of his consumption and the net gain appears to be rather small. The low value attached to consumption smoothing is a standard result from other research, for example in the theory of commodity price stabilization; the continuing income equivalent of a reduction in variance is approximately the reduction in the coefficient of Scand. J. of Economics 1992 I ----_ variation multiplied by half the coefficient of relative risk aversion, an approximation that accords well with the results in Figure 3 . But as has often been noted, these standard evaluations generate answers that reflect neither intuition nor the urgency with which policy-makers and agents in LDC's approach the stabilization issue. It is also possible to calculate how much these consumers would pay to be rid of the uncertainty altogether, and how much to be rid of the liquidity constraints, In this context, it is the liquidity constraints that hurt, much more than the uncertainty. If there is no uncertainty, the optimal policy is derived from equation (5) (9) Since impatience dominates, 6 > r, so that, if initially, the consumer has assets, they will be run down along a declining consumption path until consumption equals income, at which value it will remain thereafter. The value of this policy is the middle line in Figure 4 , higher than the value of the optimal policy with borrowing restrictions and uncertainty, but much lower than the function for the case where there are neither borrowing constraints nor uncertainty. If there are no borrowing constraints, then these impatient consumers will plan a falling consumption trajectory, with initial consumption set to satisfy the long-run budget constraint. In the case illustrated, which has the same parameters as before, initial consumption is 84 per cent higher than mean income, so that very substantial use is made of the borrowing facility, consumption is brought forward, and there are large utility gains. (I have been unable to calculate the fourth value function, for the case where there is uncertainty, but no restrictions on borrowing, but I conjecture that it lies not far below the top curve in Figure 4 .)
In practice, while agents in LDC's do borrow and lend, it is unlikely that they would be able to borrow the very large sums that their impatience might dictate, and certainly not at rates that are the same as those at which they can lend. To consider a more realistic situation, I computed one further policy function, with the same parameters as before, but now allowing a limited amount of borrowing, up to 10, which is 10 per cent of income and one standard deviation, but at the "usurious" rate of 25 per cent. The Euler equation (5) is modified fairly straightforwardly to include four "regimes" instead of two. In the worst possible states, when cash on hand is very low, the maximum of 10 is borrowed from the moneylender, consumption is cash on hand plus 10, and consumption moves one for one with resources. This is the bottom segment of the function in Figure 1 above. As resources increase, less is borrowed from the moneylender until a segment is reached on which consumption is equal to cash on hand, and for this segment the policy function runs along the 45-degree line. At yet better positions, we get the same qualitative behavior as in the original model, with something being saved, and the original and "moneylender" policy functions asymptote to one another as the level of cash on hand becomes very large, and the probability of ever having to resort to the moneylender becomes correspondingly small. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the differences in behavior and value functions generated by the presence of the moneylender. Given the penal borrowing rate, it is not surprising that the moneylender is rarely used. However, there is a noticeable effect on the downward peaks in consumption, which are much less severe in the presence of the moneylender than without. Note too that the presence of the borrowing facility means that the consumer holds fewer assets; the precautionary need for assets is less when borrowing is available, even in limited amounts and at unattractive rates. The value functions hold no great surprises and once again, the evaluation of the gain in Figure 6 is small given what appears to be the marked usefulness of borrowing in Figure 5 .
It is no simple matter to turn the theory of this section into fully articulated econometric specifications that could be confronted with the data. The lack of explicit functional forms for the optimal policy functions Scantd. J. of Economics 1992 presents computational difficulties, which would be made worse if the income process were allowed to be temporally dependent, a generalization that would certainly be required by the data. It is also unclear whether the quality of the microeconomic data on income and saving is sufficient to support the estimation of complex non-linear models. At this stage, it seems better to use these models as a guide for data exploration, and that is the purpose of the empirical section below. Note, however, the broad implications of the sort of models discussed here: (i) The dynamics of consumption and income are such as to detach consumption from income in the short-term, but not in the long-term. There is "high-frequency" consumption smoothing, but no "lowfrequency" smoothing, over the life-cycle, nor over longer secular periods. The model is consistent with some lending and borrowing for buffering purposes, but not with the existence of long-term loans for consumption purposes. Agents look ahead in an entirely rational manner, but their horizons are naturally truncated at periods when they run out of assets, beyond which there is no point in planning. Even so, rational agents would save in anticipation of short-term falls in income, and vice versa. (ii) In the cross-section, dissaving is likely to be common. If income is stationary, there will be as much dissaving as saving in the long run, and depending on the point in the agricultural cycle, large fractions of households may spend more than their income. The relationship between consumption and cash in hand depicted, for example, in Figure 1 , will not be observed directly in the data, because income processes will differ from agent to agent. Abstracting from short-term buffering behavior, consumption will match income across agents, so that the implications of the theory for cross-sectional behavior are essentially identical to those of the standard permanent income theory, and consumption rises less rapidly than income because of the increasing proportion of transitory income as income rises. (iii) Unlike the life-cycle model, buffering models do not provide an explanation for wealth holding in the society as a whole. There is no "hump" retirement saving and alternative explanations must be sought for the wealth that is actually observed. A crucial assumption in the buffering model is that consumers are impatient, so that assets are a necessary evil, lost consumption opportunities that must be held as insurance against an uncertain and dangerous future. In fact, it is reasonable to suppose that impatience is a characteristic that varies from individual to individual in the population, and that while most are too impatient to accumulate, there The survey data cannot be used directly to assess the role played by these loans in smoothing consumption. The size of the loans is not very large, especially in the rural sector, where the need for consumption smoothing would seem to be largest. For urban Ivorian households who have any loans at all, the average amount owed is around ten per cent of average consumption. For the forest zones, the ratio is closer to 5 per cent and for the Savannah it is only 1.5 per cent. For Ghana, the proportions are even smaller, between one and two per cent of average consumption. Moreover, not all loans are for consumption purposes. The survey distinguishes loans for farm, for business, for school, and for other purposes and the last category, which presumably includes borrowing for consumption, comprises little more than half of all loans in Cote d'Ivoire Although there is some evidence of "hump" saving in urban Thailand, and to a lesser extent in the sanitary districts and in Cote d'Ivoire in 1987, there is generally a close relationship between the evolution with age of consumption and income. Indeed, the relationship is even closer when purchases of durable goods are included in consumption. While such evidence casts doubt on the importance of life-cycle saving in the generation of national wealth, cross-sectional evidence is hardly conclusive. These households may have saved at some time in the past, or will do so at some time in the future, and we cannot tell how that saving may evolve with age. Nor can this evidence, by itself, by used to cast doubt on the central life-cycle proposition that consumption is determined by life-time wealth and the pattern of preferences, not by the life-time evolution of income. Tastes may vary systematically with age in a manner that is correlated with income. Indeed, as has long been recognized, the explanation is a plausible one, because the evolution of family size and responsibilities is similar to that of income.
III. Empirical Evidence from LDCs
However, the combination of the Thai and Ivorian evidence does provide evidence against the life-cycle hypothesis, and in favor of the proposition that consumption tracks income. The argument is due to Carroll and Summers (1991). According to Summers and Heston (1988) , the Thai economy has been growing at about 4 per cent per annum over the last 25 years, while the Ivorian economy has grown at a little less than 1 per cent per annum over the same period. If such growth rates are reflected in individual incomes, and if they are expected to continue, then a 25 year old in C6te d'Ivoire has expected total lifetime resources that are two-thirds larger than those of his or her 75 year-old grandparents. For Thailand, the 25 year old is 7.1 times better off than his or her grandparent. Hence, if consumption is determined by life-time resources, consumption by age patterns should be more tipped in favour of young households in Thailand and more tipped in favor of the old in Cote d'Ivoire. Precisely the opposite is true. Consumption peaks at a much earlier age in the slow-growing Cote d'Ivoire than it does in the rapidly growing Thailand. Of course, tastes and preferences may be different in the two countries, but there is a much simpler explanation, which is that the patterns of income are different in the two countries, and consumption tracks income. Indeed, if the taste explanation is to be relied upon, then family size is not the relevant variable, because family size peaks much later in Cote d'Ivoire, rising steadily from head's age 25 to 50 or later, than in Thailand, where the peak is reached by age 40.
In Figure 8 , for Thailand, note that the vertical scales for the three regions are not the same, and that the range of variation of life-time consumption in the municipal areas, from 2550 to 7550 baht, is much larger than the range in the villages, from 1500 to 3250 baht. Again, the difference is more plausibly linked to the similar paths in income than to any difference in taste variation between urban and rural regions. It is also reasonable to suppose that incomes in urban areas have been growing more rapidly over time than those in the villages. Income differences between the two areas are very large, Bangkok is a rapidly growing city that accounts for much of Thailand's urban population, and there is a limit to the rate of growth of agricultural productivity. Yet there is no evidence in Figure 8 that consumption patterns are relatively tipped towards the young in the urban areas. Once again, the simplest hypothesis, that consumption tracks income, is the most plausible. Even if this is not the case, and the life-cycle hypothesis works in each country individually, with the tracking of income by consumption largely coincidental, the comparison of the two countries must reject any model that relies on common tastes across countries, as does the standard life-cycle explanation for the positive international correlation between saving and growth.
IV. Conclusions
The results of this study should be read in conjunction with the evolving literature on saving in developing countries, and are placed in more extensive context in the full version of this paper, Deaton (1991 b). My own earlier work for the C6te d'Ivoire, Deaton (1990b), and Paxson's (1991), (1992) work for Thailand, confirm some but not all aspects of life-cycle theory. In particular, these papers provide evidence that farmers (and others) look ahead at least some way when deciding how much to consume and to save, but they do not support the cross-equation restrictions generated either by the full permanent income hypothesis, nor by any simple modification based on the way liquidity constraints might work. More general reviews of the undoubted progress in the area can be found in Gersovitz (1988) and Deaton (1990a). However, it will also be clear that much remains to be done. Although the data and the models generate what appear to be real insights, we are far from a really satisfactory understanding of all the evidence. The data themselves are difficult to use. Income is not a concept that is easily measured, particularly for people who are selfemployed (in agriculture or elsewhere), and it is in the analysis of saving that data deficiencies are probably at their most acute. Except for the fact that there are more self-employed workers in LDC's, I do not believe that saving data are any worse in developing than in developed economies; indeed, high response rates and the willingness of "fresh" interviewees to spend a great deal of time with survey staff suggests the reverse. Even so, there is a great deal of measurement error in both income and saving, and the measurement error in each is almost certainly correlated, facts that must be recognized in any credible econometric analysis. The theories examined in the paper are useful, but none is strongly supported by the evidence. The model without borrowing is a useful benchmark and shows that it is possible for consumption to be very much smoother than income even without the intermediation of credit markets. However, there are important elements of reality that are not captured by such a formulation, and it is difficult to use the model to derive empirical predictions that can be readily tested on the data.
